A power shift among the nations of the planet began at the top of the conflict and has been fast this century. Creative destruction may be delineated because the dismantlement of long-standing practices so as to form means for innovation. Creative destruction was first coined by Austrian economic expert Joseph Schumpeter in 1942. Joseph Schumpeter describes creative destruction as innovations within the producing method that increase productivity, however the term has been adopted to be used in several alternative contexts.

The theory of creative destruction assumes that long-standing arrangements and assumptions should be destroyed to unencumber resources and energy to be deployed for innovation. Creative destruction theory treats political economy as an organic and dynamic method. This stands in stark distinction with the static mathematical models of ancient Cambridge-tradition political economy. 

Equilibrium is not any longer the tip goal of market processes. Instead, several unsteady dynamics area unit perpetually reshaped or replaced by innovation and competition or “innovators destroy established businesses”.

As is inexplicit by the word destruction, the method inevitably leads to losers and winners. Entrepreneurs and staff in new technologies can inevitably produce state of affairs and highlight new profit opportunities. Producers and staff committed to the older technology are left stranded. To Schumpeter, economic development is that the natural results of forces internal to the market and is made by the chance to hunt profit (KOPP, 2019).

China and India continue to raise their productivity level towards western levels, whereas having huge populations. However what recent developments demonstrate is that the importance of taking a nuanced and differentiated approach to assessing the prospects for specific rising and developed economies. 

Whereas the accord seems to be that over future few years the world economy can have a comparatively low trade goods value surroundings, wanting any ahead, the extremely volatile nature of trade goods costs can still drive the prospects for a few economies, whereas conjointly creating the case for bigger sectoral diversification.

American global power has been eroding for some time. The power of other countries has grown, giving them both the ability and the desire to effect global affairs independently of U.S. desires (Adams, 2018). China and India are 1/3 of world’s population with high growth rates, likely to keep growing, and shifting the technological balance of power.

Nowadays, the concept of balance of power doesn’t only mean for military power, but technological power. America will be replaced by China and India in the sector of technology. As we know the technology sector in China with 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the technology infrastructure such as server in India are growing rapidly along with much advantages like lower price, innovations, variations, and human resources.

The technology are now combine with product and service sector. The U.S. hegemony is declining. U.S. growth rate has fallen by ½ since the beginning of the century. It has debt, deficit, and energy dependent. Meanwhile, China’s share of global product has grown by 144% and India is growing at 5% per year.  

Furthermore, Liberal institutionalism, argue that the economic interdependency, within the era of economic process (especially between the U.S. and regional actors) combined with China’s continued, and in some cases, increasing participation in international establishments can before long trump any security competition between the 2 (or others) states (Corcoran, 2011). And by virtue of what liberals refer to as the democratic peace theory; the prospects for conflict are extremely low, if not non-existent. 

More specifically, classical liberalism argues, “that if marketization and democratization take place in China, the economic rise of China will not pose a threat to peace” (Rousseau, 2003). In other words, China’s ever-changing domestic landscape (emergence of a socio-economic class through free-market principles), can ultimately result in democratization; the results of which might offset any security competition between states concerned within the economic relationship (Corcoran, 2011).

Increase in wealth due to market economy has brought about immense benefits, bolstered by capitalism and free trade. These developments have simultaneously been accompanied by political rights (Goswami, 2013). China and India are most commonly viewed in tandem as the two emerging powers with the potential to change the geopolitical order. Both exhibit deep frustrations over the way they have been treated within the global system. China and India were expected to be agents of powerful change in multilateral fora for the benefit of the Global South.

Neither country, however, has exhibited any strong desire for revisionism; for challenging and altering the status quo of the international order (for more, see Johnston 2003). Indeed, the term “Chindia” became popular in the early 2000s as a means to differentiate the super-sized character of both China and India in the global economy (Ramesh, 2005).

Membership in the elevated G20 at the leaders’ level was accepted with little or no debate by the other members as a measure of recognition of India and China’s rising status in the global system. At the same time, both countries continued to probe ways to go around the established institutional structure, most notably through the projection of the BRICS forum which encompasses China and India, as well as Russia and Brazil (with the addition of South Africa in 2010) (Farooq, 2016).